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Electricity markets are increasingly moving from a design wherein firms are 
compensated solely for the energy they provide (‘energy only’ markets) to one 
where firms are also compensated separately for other costs incurred. One 
example of a separate payment intended to compensate a firm for other costs 
incurred is a capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM). CRMs are designed to 
compensate firms for their fixed costs of capacity, or the cost of building the 
power plant. In this way, CRMs help to ensure that sufficient electricity 
generation capacity exists to provide sufficient generation during peak demand 
hours, ensuring reliable supply. 
Electricity generators do not exhibit complete reliability, in that they may not be 
available to generate at every point in time. Generators may be unavailable when 
they are out of service for routine repairs, or may also be unavailable due to a 
technical fault. Furthermore, the availability of variable renewable generation, 
such as wind and solar, depends on the weather. The reliability of the total 
electricity generation fleet will thus depend not only on the amount of generation 
capacity installed, but also on the reliability of each unit, and therefore on how 
likely it is that a particular unit will not be available to generate in any given time 
period. Firms may choose to refurbish units in order to improve their reliability 
and reduce the probability of being unavailable in any given time period. 
This paper examines the potential for different CRMs to incentivise investment in 
new generation capacity and also to refurbish existing power plants, thereby 
increasing their reliability. Two capacity mechanisms are considered. The first is a 
price-based mechanism, in which a policy-maker, regulator or Transmission 
System Operator (TSO) determines a fixed amount of remuneration for power 
plants each year, and this total sum is spread over all units according to their 
capacity (i.e. how much power they can generate). Thus, a higher amount of 
installed generation leads to lower payment per power plant, and vice versa. The 
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second mechanism is a quantity-based mechanism, in which the policy-maker 
decides on a target level of capacity for the period in question (i.e., one year), and 
provides a capacity payment to all firms that hold capacity up to this target level. 
Firms compete in an auction to receive a capacity payment. A firm that is in 
receipt of a capacity payment must repay the difference between the energy 
price and a predetermined strike price to the TSO whenever the energy price 
rises above the strike price. This provides the firms with an incentive to be 
available to generate in all possible time periods. 
We solve the model under various input scenarios without allowing firms to 
refurbish their units and also allowing them to make refurbishment decisions. We 
find that when refurbishment is not allowed, the quantity-based mechanism 
lowers final costs to consumers, while the price-based mechanism incentivises 
higher levels of investment and therefore higher levels of reliability. There is thus 
a trade-off between the cost and the reliability of electricity supply, from the 
consumer’s point of view. 
When refurbishment is allowed, the cost to the consumers is the same under 
both mechanisms, with the exception of a sensitivity scenario performed in which 
there were high levels of initial capacity. Under this scenario, the quantity-based 
mechanism led to lower consumer costs. All firms refurbished their units to the 
maximum extent possible, which brought about the maximum possible level of 
reliability for the system as a whole. The total amount of electricity generation 
and investment was equal under both mechanisms, as were prices. 
In both cases, there was no market exit under initial levels of over-capacity. 
Therefore a quantity-based mechanism, which limits capacity revenues to a 
target level of capacity only, did not reduce total capacity to the target level. 
This work shows that the differences between capacity remuneration 
mechanisms may depend (at least partially) on the extent to which firms can 
refurbish their units to improve their reliability. There may be technical and/or 
economic limitations on the extent to which reliability can be improved, which 
could see differences between the mechanisms emerging. In this case, policy-
makers may have to determine the socially acceptable trade-off between cost 
and reliability of supply. 
This work also questions whether overcapacity will arise due to the design of the 
capacity remuneration mechanism, and whether a quantity-based mechanism is 
likely to induce exit over and above a price-based mechanism. Policy-makers who 
are concerned about excess capacity on a particular system should ensure that 
this overcapacity is not due to excess revenues being earned through other 
market mechanisms before attempting to reduce over-capacity through the 
design of the capacity remuneration mechanism.  
